Abstract -In today's world, where most of the critical infrastructures are based on distributed systems, security failures have become very common, even within large corporations. A system with security loopholes can be damaging for companies, both in terms of reputation and finances, while customers are reluctant to use such systems. In that respect, providing stakeholders with quantifiable evidences that the countermeasures deployed on the system are operating adequately is an important step towards better control of security failures for network administrators on one hand, and an increase in end users' trust in using these systems on the other. It is in that perspective that BUGYO, a methodology to assess the security of telecommunication networks and services in terms of assurance levels, was proposed to address the shortcomings of existing security assurance and risks management methodologies in measuring, documenting and maintaining security assurance of telecommunication services. In this paper, we provide an overview of the BUGYO methodology and we demonstrate its applicability (mainly with respect to the specification of assurance metrics) on a VoIP service infrastructure based on open source components.
INTRODUCTION
The need to provide stakeholders with confidence that deployed security measures meet their requirements at runtime has been acknowledged as a crucial issue [1] [2] [3] [16] . This is mainly because, security measures, even properly elucidated during the risks management stages, may be deployed inadequately or hazards in the system environment may render them less effective.
When dealing with complex and critical systems such as telecommunication infrastructures, providing continuous monitoring so to get some assurance on the quality of the service being provided is paramount. This is due to the fact that telecommunication infrastructures are exposed to a continuously and permanently increasing set of risks and security threats [1] and furthermore, recurrent telecommunication failures can have a negative impact on the reputation of the service provider, leading often to financial losses. Developing indicators for the monitoring of IT infrastructures, as similarly done in fields such as financial markets, would therefore enable a more systematic appreciation of the reliability of the infrastructures providing the overall telecom service.
Current state of the art measures in security assurance has revealed the existence of several commercial initiatives (for example CYBERTRUST and Network security consulting), standards (see for instance [3] ), risk management methodologies (such as [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] ) as well as security relevant software engineering methodologies proposed by the scientific community (see for example [4] [5] [13] [14] ).
However, none of these methodologies fully addresses the issue of security assurance in telecommunication services or when they do, the focus is just put either at products or systems level [3] or on the IT networks [4] [5] . This has prompted the need for a new approach in measuring, documenting and maintaining security assurance for complex systems such as telecommunications services. In view of bridging that gap, the BUGYO (Building Security Assurance in Open Infrastructures) methodology has provided a framework that focuses on the telecommunication infrastructure and services to address the problem of security assurance in telecommunication. The methodology builds upon a well-known security assurance standard (the common criteria) [3] and aims at verifying that the services are securely provided through the infrastructures. In other words, BUGYO helps in providing security assurance, here defined as "the ground for confidence that an entity meets its security objectives". The gathering of that measurable evidence is facilitated by the specification of metrics that are necessary for the normalization of the security assurance levels. The evaluation of the assurance level is based on the availability, compliance and vulnerability of the implemented security measures. The present paper is structured as follows: Related work are outlined is section 2. A brief review of the BUGYO methodology stages are provided in section 3. An example based on a VoIP system is used as application for the methodology in section 4 of the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The most recognised security assurance assessment methodology in the industry is defined by the ISO/IEC 15408 standard, also known as Common Criteria (CC). The Common Criteria defines security assurance evaluation requirements for the development and design phases. The associated methodology to apply is defined in the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) (prior versions of which are available as ISO/IEC 18045). This methodology is not directly applicable for an evaluation of the security assurance of a system in operation.CEM defines how the system must be developed, but not how to maintain it in the "correct" (i.e. intended) state. Extensive works have been done in defining metrics taxonomy. In [16] , for instance, the authors propose a novel definition for Information assurance that is then used to develop a taxonomy of Information assurance metrics group which can be used for the measurement of IT information assurance. Vaughn et.al. [17] divide their taxonomy into two distinct categories of metrics. The first category (organizational security) of metrics aims at assessing the "Information Assurance (IA) posture" (i.e. the actual state) of an organization whiled the second category is for assessing the IA capabilities of a product or system (Technical Target of Assessment -TTOA). The second category of metrics is for the Technical Target Of Assessment (TTOA). This type of metric is intended to measure how much a technical object, system or product is capable of providing security in terms of protection, detection and response. This category is often used in comparing or differentiating between alternative and competing TTOA, e.g. the EAL ratings of the Common Criteria. The authors further divide the metrics for the TTOA into two sub-categories -metrics for measuring a TTOA's strengths and metrics for measuring a TTOA's weaknesses.
The Security Metrics Guide for Information Technology Systems [18] and [19] is a special publication of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The security metrics guide of the NIST provides guidance on how an organisation, through the use of metrics, identifies the adequacy of in-place security controls, policies, and procedures. It describes the metric development and implementation process and how it can be used to adequately justify security control investments. This process is called a Security metrics program and is to be employed as part of an Information Security Program. The previous work of the NIST identifies 17 metrics groups, which are classified in three categories: management, operational and technical. The new version (NIST SP 800-55) [19] provides a recommended methodology for quantifying the critical elements and for validating the implementation and effectiveness of the system security control objectives and techniques. However these contributions only provide means to find the metrics and do not indicate how to combine them into system-wide values in addition to lacking modeling technique which is crucial for building a tool evaluating the assurance of a system.
III.THE BUGYO OPERATIONAL METHODOLOGY

A. Assurance taxonomy
The security assurance taxonomy aims to allow for a clear definition of the security assurance levels. Inspired by the Common Criteria, we define a number of generically comparable assurance levels. As such, the Common Criteria indicates that different levels of assurance are possible depending on the rigor (more details investigated gives more assurance), scope (broader scope gives more assurance) and depth of the verification with respect to the security functionalities of a system. Those parameters are used in BUGYO, but owing to the need to assess assurance in (close to) real-time for large telecom networks; other criteria have been added to determine the assurance level that can be assigned to a system. Before we continue with the specification of the levels, it is important to clarify our understanding of what assurance levels express. In our view, assurance levels should be built depending on the amount of confidence that they allow and that the defined security mechanisms are working as expected. We consider the growth in confidence between two successive assurances levels to be nonlinear, but rather following a logarithmic increase of confidence that asymptotically approaches a full confidence but never reaches it (Fig. 1) . The reason it is impossible to reach is twofold. First of all, the full representation of a real system is not possible according to the system theory. And secondly, the time dependency of assurance evaluation makes it impossible -i.e. a momentary evaluation of all factors of a system is not doable due to latencies. Additionally, it is worth notifying that although we assume a logarithmic scale we are not capable to express the exact distance between the assurance levels but only see a qualitative improvement. The indicated assurance level should, however, indicate the expectable real assurance in relation to the effort spent (i.e. higher levels provide more assurance and are more difficult to achieve). 
Assurance levels
By analogy to the Common Criteria, we state that assurance level should be defined with a discrete scale of assurance levels, and that each level of the scale must include the level just above it. Unlike the CC, the BUGYO methodology defines five levels due to the following pragmatic considerations and also to our perception of experiences with the Common Criteria:
-We considered it important to have an odd number of assurance levels so that it is possible to have a medium assurance level (i.e. although only ordinal, the scale is required to have a conceptual middle point). -The CC evaluation assurance scheme contains seven evaluation assurance levels. However, to our knowledge (almost) none of the system has been evaluated higher than level five. With our scheme, we do not intent to reproduce levels that are not reachable. In general, systems are highly complex and it is unlikely for us that they can satisfy formal evaluation methods. Therefore it did not seem suitable to include levels that are only achievable formally.
-To provide only three assurance levels did not provide enough granularity in our view as our intention is (a) the highest assurance levels should be very hard to achieve (but not impossible) and (b) the lowest assurance level can be achieved by setting up a control system (as it provides already a basic level of confidence). We therefore derived the following five assurance levels with their associated definition (refer to table I) Our basic postulate is that assurance levels are ordinal (i.e. ordered with an undefined distance between values). A second postulate is that a higher level, we call it B, includes all assurance indications (i.e. requirements) of the level below it, which we call A.
To be complete (and compliant with our intention of an ordinal scale) we have to define an assurance level AL0 with no assurance indication (AL0 is the empty set)
Assurance Classes
Table II represents a summary of the defined ALs. The columns represent an ordinal set of ALs, while the rows represent assurance classes and families of criteria we use in order to express the requirements for the various assurance levels with respect to the assurance level taxonomy defined above. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where higher numbers imply increased requirements. While the presented ALs are defined in BUGYO, other combinations are imaginable under the condition that the ordinal property is preserved. This means for example that a system satisfies AL2 if one or more components satisfy AL3 or higher requirements. We think that such a combination is possible and meaningful to define if the goal is to stepwise improve towards the next assurance level. Note, that we do not intend to use AL2+ or similar, to indicate such (i.e. we do not want a finer granularity that makes it in our view only harder to interpret an AL for the recipient). This paper does not cover the description of the classes and their component families. However it is important to notice that the presentation of the assurance classes follows the example set by the Common Criteria. First, a description of each class and the families it contains followed by the description of the families and their dependencies and components. The components are hierarchical and, if not otherwise specified, higher-level components include the lower levels.
Assurance levels Definition
AL1
Rudimentary evidence for parts AL2 Regular informal evidence for selected parts AL3
Frequent informal evidence for selected parts AL4
Continuous informal evidence for significant parts AL5
Continuous semi-formal evidence for the entire system 
B. Steps of the methodology
The BUGYO methodology has three distinct functions; they are measurement, monitoring and assistance. To help fulfill those functions, the operational methodology [6] has been divided into six steps: Model the service, select the metrics, measurement, aggregation, evaluation and monitoring. Due to paper limitation, stages of the methodology that are considered less relevant to the focus of this paper have been described briefly.
Service modeling
The first step concerns services modeling. The modeling allows decomposing the service in order to identify assurance critical components. An efficient way of identifying those critical components is an a priori use of a risk assessment methodology. Weights are then assigned to each infrastructure object to account for their respective impact on the overall service
Selection of metrics
Within the BUGYO project, a metric is defined as a modeling object defined as the process that allows producing a normalized assurance level for an Infrastructure Object. A description of this process is proposed in the present section. A metric is based on the measurement of various parts/parameters of security functions implemented on infrastructure objects that compose a network service. As shown in Fig. 2 , one metric is linked to one and only one infrastructure object while one infrastructure object can be linked to several metrics. This decomposition helps to simplify the problem of normalizing the raw measurement results or base measures (in reference to ISO [7] terminology). By interpreting the interdependent base measures of the metric we produce independent derived measures (still in reference to ISO [7] terminology). Finally, those derived measures are composed in order to produce a normalized and infrastructure related discrete Assurance Level. Depending on the measurements being performed, metrics can be classified into three categories: -Availability relates to a measurement that monitors whether a counter-measure exists and is available.
-Conformity deals with a measurement that controls configuration conformity of a counter-measure.
-Vulnerability relates to a measurement that verifies whether the counter-measure itself is not vulnerable. Using a twofold aggregation process, base measures are first aggregated into corresponding meta-measures or category and then the meta-measures are aggregated into metrics as depicted in figure 4 . In view of facilitating the specification of metrics, a metric template has been developed.
The metrics template is composed of three major parts: The first part consists in providing information related to:
• The objectives of the metrics
• The infrastructure objects concerned
• The countermeasure to be controlled
• The metric category
Once this information has been completed, a metric diagram is drawn (see Fig. 3 ) linking the different potential risks to the infrastructure object, the countermeasure and the necessary measurements (base measures, references, derived measures). In the last section of the template, the achievable security assurance level is evaluated. By filling in the information related to the parameters of the metrics (scope, rigor…), one could then use the assurance level matrix (Table II) to decide on the achievable level. Since it is likely that two different protection measures for the same infrastructure will not have the same effectiveness, knowing the maximum confidence they provide is relevant in appreciating the outcome of their actions or reactions.
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Measurement
Measurement consists in deploying specific probes implementing metrics through the network. Those probes will help capture raw data from the infrastructure referred to as base measures. Depending on the level of knowledge that the expert developing the probes holds on the security functions, a measurement can be identified as white box measurement (he/she possesses the knowledge) or black box measurement (lack of the knowledge). By comparing the base measure to a reference measure, the concerned probes will evaluate whether a security function is operating has been deployed adequately. The evaluation process will result in a derived measure that will then be normalized to produce an assurance level.
Aggregation
Once the assurances level are determined at components level, an aggregation process is undertaken during step four, using a linear or non-linear algorithm, to compute the overall security assurance at infrastructures and service level. There are three main algorithms used for the operational aggregation [6] : the recursive minimum algorithm, the recursive maximum algorithm and the recursive weighted sum algorithm.
The recursive minimum algorithm, applied to systems with several critical points, implies that the overall assurance of a service is represented by the lowest metric of its components. One potential usage of this model can occur when BUGYO is deployed at the first time or when operators want to deploy assurance metrics but without any strong idea on relative importance of each infrastructure object taken part in the service. The recursive maximum algorithm, however, commands that the assurance of a service be the highest of its components metrics. The following example taken from [20] illustrates a situation where the recursive maximum algorithm can be used: considering two antivirus applications AV1 and AV2, the AV1 can destroy viruses v1, v2 and v3 while the AV2 can destroy only v1. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the importance of each virus is equal. The aggregated security assurance value of these two anti-viruses can be calculated as max (SAV1, SAV2) where SAV1 and SAV2 are the security assurance values of AV1 and AV2 respectively. The recursive weighted sum algorithm is used for systems composed of security functions that contribute in different, non critical manner (the failure of one security function does not lead to the complete failure of the system security) to service security implemented by independent observed system parts. It uses weight properties model to calculate the assurance level value at each level of the assurance model of a service and reflects more precisely the assurance needs described in the model.
The recursive weighted sum algorithm, although more complex, can be considered to be the most optimal as it does not require powerful computation and can monitor any minor change in the infrastructure.
Evaluation
The evaluation process involves comparing the current value of the assurance level to the previous measure, or to a certain threshold and issuing an appropriate message. In addition, it helps the operator in making appropriate decision based on the evaluation result.
Monitoring
The final step or monitoring step is concerned with providing a real time display of security assurance of the service to help the operator identify causes of security assurance deviation and also assist him/her in making decisions. The BUGYO framework is applied on a VoIP platform (Fig. 5) , based on open sources components, and composed of several servers:
The IPBX server (open source in license GPL) allows interoperability between a phone switch deployed on Linux and:
• Message recorder • Conference call • Calls Distribution The DNS server. RADIUS and TFTP server for the identification of the users Virtual machines (VMware) that has the following advantages:
• Decreasing the number of needed physical machines • Portability of the virtual machines Linux operating system on a Windows machine (and/or inversely) Soft-phones and hard-phones allowing testing our architecture. Classical network components such as Firewall, routers and VPN gateways.
The deployment of the methodology is based on the usage of a Multi Agents System (MAS) [21] platform using Jade [22] .
For the purpose of applying the methodology, we consider a scenario that will enable the specification of metrics. In that scenario, errors have been injected into the address resolution file in order to corrupt DNS Bind9. It is important to notify that this demonstration mainly focus on step 2-5 of the methodology, especially on the specification of metrics.
A. The DNS example
The objective of this metric is to provide security assurance information about the DNS service, and uncorrupted name resolution. Therefore the infrastructure of concern has been identified as the DNS 9 and the countermeasures to control, the security functions that checks the address resolution files integrity and the DNS user (bind) integrity. This metric provides an assurance level for the compliance and non-vulnerability of the controlled counter-measures. A summary of the metric and the associated derived measures are shown in figure 6 .
An illicit modification of the DNS configuration can cause the transmission of malicious informations and affecting the security of the DNS dependent elements
Risks for the service
Check the adress resolution files ,and the integrity of the configuration DNS file
Counter-measures
Check the address resolution files' integrity 
Base measures
Samhain, scripts
Probes
Derived measure 2
Check the integrity of the DNS user (bind).
Normal identity rights and permission and groups of the 'bind'user /etc/group /etc/passwd
Reference
-Check the integrity of the bind user.
Base measures
Scripts
Probes
Derived measure 1 Figure 6 . Metrics diagram for the DNS For pragmatic reason, we assume that the achievable assurance level is 2, i.e. regular informal evidence for relevant part of the countermeasures is used to judge on the effectiveness of a security function. 
Derived measure 1
In this test, two probes are used for the measurement of the derived measures:
• The Samhain [24] , an open source host-based intrusion detection system using cryptographic checksums of files to detect modifications. An effective functioning of that probe will allow the detection of any malicious attack that could lead to the address resolution files integrity being corrupted.
• Scripts checking whether the resolution files are well constructed. The checking frequency assigned to these two probes is one hour. Table II lists the necessary base measures and references to provide complete security assurance information.
Taking into account the achievable assurance level provided (level 2), the derived measures can be classified (depending on the gravity of the security breach) as shown below:
• If the address resolution files integrity is compromised:
Corrupted files and errors (configuration errors) then the derived measure value is 0.
• If the address resolution files integrity is compromised: corrupted files, evil-minded modifications then the derived measure is 1. In both the above cases, an appropriate alarm message is generated to the operator, providing details on the problem.
• Otherwise, the resulting derived measure is 2 
Derived measure 2
For this derived measure, only scripts are used to perform checks on whether the bind user has a correct identity, specific right and permission and if he/she belongs to a specific group. In that respect, specifics checks are made (hourly rate) on the user's identity through file, password checking…and also on whether the user is affiliated to the right group. Table III lists the base measures necessary for the evaluation of security assurance. Similarly to derived measure 1, three case scenarios are predictable:
• The bind user's identity (/etc/password) is compromised, then the derived measured is 0 and an alarm message is issued to the operator notifying him/her of the risk.
• The bind user's identity is safe, but he/she belong to the wrong group. In that case the derived measure is 1 and an appropriate message is Check if the bind user has a correct identity, specific right and permission (etc/password).
Scripts 1 hour
Integrity of bind user: groups.
Check if the bind user belongs to the wrong groups.
Scripts 1hour
Normalization for the DNS metrics
A final summary on both derived measures and the metric values is provided in table IV. 
OK
Using the minimum recursive function, the metric value of the countermeasures is given by the equation below:
Metric value= Min (derived measure 1, derived measure 2) = Min (address resolution files integrity, checking the DNS user (bind) integrity)
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrated the applicability of a security assurance methodology for telecommunication infrastructure (BUGYO) on a VoIP infrastructure. The specification of metrics has helped determine the effectiveness of the security measures deployed on the infrastructure. From our experience, a good understanding of the infrastructure is imperative for a better specification of the security model that will guarantee a better selection of metrics.
The methodology can be of paramount relevance in area such as wireless networks where it can be adopted as a security application to face up to the growing problem of security. It can be adopted as a complementary methodology to the several and diverse applications and technologies, essential to making wireless computing more secure, explored in [23] . In addition, the methodology could also be used by companies to document, measure and monitor their security assurance and be compliant of governments' requirements such as Sarbanes-Oxley and Basel II.
In terms of perspectives, the extension of the methodology in a way to handle security assurance in a dynamic environment is being explored along with the use of selflearning agents for the collection, measurement of the assurance levels. Furthermore, if it agreed on the need to know how effective the security countermeasures are in critical infrastructures, integrating automatic reaction measures that allow the system to respond to an imminent failure is also paramount and requires some attention.
